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Abstract: This study investigates the influence of migrant remittances on two 
dimensions of the financial sector, namely, size and efficiency in a sample of 94 non-
OECD economies. Evidence suggests that migrant remittances contribute to 
increasing the size and efficiency of the financial sector. The study, in addition, 
examines the impact of remittances on financial sector size and efficiency through 
their interaction with the government ownership of banks. The results suggest that 
remittances lead to larger increases in financial sector size in countries in which the 
government ownership of banks is lower, and increases in efficiency in countries in 
which the government ownership of banks is higher.  
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1.  Introduction 
Remittance inflows into the developing economies have increased ten-fold from US 
$31,058 million to US$327,591 million over the 1990 to 2008 period, accounting for 
the second largest foreign exchange inflow next to foreign direct investment, and in 
some cases the largest (World Bank, 2012). Migrant remittances can promote 
financial development in the recipient countries by increasing the volume of deposits 
with financial institutions. Remittances can also bring a larger proportion of a 
country’s ‘unbanked’ population in contact with the formal financial system by 
increasing the availability of credit and banking services to the public such as savings 
accounts and small scale loans (IMF 2005).  
 
The relation between remittances and the financial sector has been examined in the 
studies of Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009), Aggarwal et al. (2006), Orozco and 
Fedewa (2005), Munduca (2009), Gupta et al.(2009) among others. Giuliano and 
Ruiz-Arranz (2009) conclude that remittances can promote economic growth in the 
developing economies by enhancing financial sector development, particularly in 
financially less developed economies. Aggrawal et al. (2006) find that migrant 
remittances lead to financial sector development in the developing economies by 
leading to increases in the aggregate volume of deposits and credit intermediated by 
the banking sector. Examining the effect of remittances on poverty and financial 
development in Sub-Saharan Africa, Gupta et al. (2009) find that remittances have a 
positive effect on both poverty and financial development. In a case study of nine 
financial institutions in South America, Orozco and Fedewa (2005) show that 
financial institutions’ distribution of transfers, and financial services provided depend 
on the resources of the institution and its existing presence in the community. While 
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these studies emphasize the positive effects of remittances on financial sector size, the 
effects of remittances on financial sector efficiency are less well understood. 
 
Mundaca (2009) using a panel dataset from Latin America, shows that remittances 
can further promote economic growth in economies with well developed financial 
markets. Modelling the entry of banks into the remittance market, Alberola and 
Salvado (2006) observe that banks as opposed to smaller money transmitter operators, 
have the ability to offer lower remittance transmission fees thereby increasing the 
volume of remittances into recipient countries. Freund and Spatafora (2008) on the 
other hand, argue that formal transmission channels such as banks are more expensive 
compared to informal transmission channels. In a panel dataset covering 104 
countries, they show that remittances are transmitted through formal channels in 
countries which have well developed financial systems. Acosta et al. (2009) 
investigating the effects of remittances on the exchange rate on 109 developing and 
transition economies find that upward pressure on exchange rates brought about by 
the increase in remittances, are lower in countries with well developed financial 
markets. While these studies are indirectly related to the hypothesis of financial sector 
efficiency, there is no explicit reference to efficiency. 
 
The present study is closely related to the literature that investigates the relation 
between remittance flows and the financial sector. The studies hereto, have explored 
the effects of remittance inflows on financial sector size. The majority of studies 
undertaken on the impact of remittances on financial sector size as measured by the 
ratio of deposits to GDP, private credit to GDP, and liquid assets to GDP, show that 
migrant remittances have a positive influence on financial sector size. A study by 
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Brown et al. (2011) however, suggests that remittances by reducing financial 
constraints, reduces the demand for credit. The present study differs from the previous 
literature in that it not only examines the effect of migrant remittances on financial 
sector size, but also efficiency. The impact of remittance inflows on financial sector 
efficiency are measured by overhead costs and net interest margins. If remittances 
lead to an increase in efficiency this would benefit the public due to reduced overhead 
costs and net interest margins. Increases in overhead costs and net interest margins on 
the other hand, would lead a fall in financial sector efficiency.  
 
A related issue that has not been explored is, the role played by government owned 
banks in determining the magnitude and efficiency of remittances. In the developing 
economies, the government plays a major role in setting up banks in rural areas and 
providing access to finance. The role of the government in promoting financial sector 
development has been highlighted in the work of Demirguc-Kunt (2006). Therefore, 
the present study in addition, investigates if the impact of remittances on financial 
sector size and efficiency, are conditional on the degree of government ownership of 
banks. There are two views associated with government involvement in the financial 
sector. The development view associated with Gerschenkron (1962) and Lewis 
(1950), and the political view associated with Kornai (1979) and Shleifer and Vishney 
(1994). The political view argues that the government, by pursuing its own political 
objectives is subject to conflicting interests which can lead to inefficient outcomes, 
primarily in economies with weak property rights. This could lead to increased 
interest margins and overhead costs. The development view on the other hand, argues 
that the government can help overcome market failures and promote development 
through lower costs and increased access to finance, particularly in the developing 
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economies. Government ownership can also play an important role in retaining 
savings within a financial system where regulation is not of high quality (Shortland 
2009). Consequently the contribution of this study is threefold: one, to investigate the 
effects of migrant remittances on financial sector size; two, to examine the effect of 
remittances on financial sector efficiency; and three, to explore the relation between 
migrant remittances and financial sector development through the government 
ownership of banks channel. The study is restricted to a sample of 94 non-OECD 
nations. 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 states the hypotheses. Section 
3 examines some country characteristics.  Section 4 describes the data and estimation 
methodology. Section 5 presents the empirical results, and conclusions are 
summarised in Section 6. 
 
2.  Hypotheses 
This study tests the hypotheses that: 
1)  Migrant remittances influence the size of the financial sector 
2)  Migrant remittances influence the efficiency of the financial sector. 
3)  Despite the fact that remittances can affect the financial sector through a number 
of channels, this study then goes on to investigate if remittances influence the 
financial sector through the government ownership of banks channel. To test this 
hypothesis, the remittance variable is interacted with the government ownership of 
banks. This interaction term will show the degree to which the prevalence of state 
owned banks matter for the influence of remittances on financial sector development. 
Given that remittances have a positive effect on financial sector size, a positive 
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interaction term would imply that remittances have a larger effect on financial sector 
size in countries with high government ownership of banks, while a negative 
interaction term would indicate that remittances have a larger effect on financial 
sector size in countries with low government ownership of banks.  Also, given that 
remittances lead to greater financial sector efficiency in terms of lower overhead costs 
and net interest margins, a positive interaction term would imply that remittances 
have a larger effect on financial sector efficiency in countries with low government 
ownership of banks, while a negative interaction term would indicate that remittances 
have a larger effect on financial sector efficiency in countries with high government 
ownership of banks.  
Migrant Remittances, Government Ownership and the Size and Efficiency of the 
Financial Sector 
Remittances are an important, and sometimes, the only means of access to financial 
services by households in low income economies. Remittances help low income 
households to accumulate funds which can be used to finance future consumption or 
investment. These funds may be used to smooth consumption in the event of 
unexpected fluctuations in income (Yang and Choi 2007), and increase the propensity 
to save. The accumulation of savings in turn, can create the opportunity for lending 
these funds back into the community. The hypothesis that remittances have a positive 
impact on financial sector size is supported in the work of Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 
(2009), Aggarwal et al. (2006), Orozco and Fedewa (2005), Gupta et al. 2009. The 
argument underlying this hypothesis is that remittances contribute to financial sector 
development by promoting “financial literacy” in remittance receiving households, 
increasing the demand for and use of banking services, and the availability of credit in 
the financial sector (see Brown et al. 2011). Here, the mobilization of remittances by 
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financial institutions, contribute to alleviating financial constraints in the credit 
market (Hernandez 2009). Brown at al. (2011) however, in a study of Azerbaijan and 
Kyrgyzstan, find that the converse holds. That is, remittances act as a substitute for 
credit, reducing household financial constraints, leading to a lower demand for credit. 
This argument runs counter to the financial literacy hypothesis. Remittances may also 
not lead to an increase in the volume of deposits in the financial system if they are 
consumed, or households save this money in other forms (Hernandez 2009). 
 
While there is a literature that investigates the effect of remittance transfer costs on 
efficiency, Alberola and Salvado (2006), Beck and Martinez Peria (2011), Freund and 
Spatafora (2008), there is an absence of studies which investigate the effect of 
remittances on financial sector efficiency1. The present study therefore, is a first 
attempt at investigating empirically, the hypothesis that remittances influence 
financial sector efficiency. According to the financial literacy argument, remittances, 
is an effective means through which the rural population can be integrated into the 
formal financial system. Hence, through what channels do banks leverage remittances 
to make financial services more efficient? Changes in overhead and other operating 
costs are reflected in bank interest rate margins, which are passed on by banks to 
depositors and lenders (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 2004). Accordingly, if 
remittances increase the availability of credit through larger deposits, they can 
contribute to lowering overhead costs and net interest margins. Evidence shows that 
increased deposits have led to an increase in bank liquidity, leading to a fall in bank 
interest rates in some countries. For example, remittances contributed to an increase in 
deposits in Nepal, from Nepalese Rupees 697 in July 2011 to Rupees 743 billion in 
                                                 
1 The OECD (2006) cites reduced banking costs as a potential benefit of increased remittances. 
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December 2011, and an increase in lending from Rupees 521 to Rupees 542 billion in 
the same period. This in turn led to a lowering of interest rates in Nepal (The 
Kathmandu Post 2011). Remittances can also act as a substitute for inefficient credit 
markets by enabling individuals to start business without collateral or high borrowing 
costs (Hernandez 2009, Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2009). Another channel through 
which increased efficiency can be achieved is through the increase in bank reserves. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) show that increased bank reserves reduce 
interest margins and profits particularly, in developing countries. Remittances have 
led to an increase in bank reserves in a number of developing countries. Therefore, 
remittances by increasing bank reserves, can reduce overhead costs and interest 
margins. Conversely, if remittances allow banks to earn monopolistic profits, this will 
lead to higher bank overhead costs and net interest margins. Therefore banks can also 
pass on higher operating and overhead costs to depositors and lenders (Demirguc-
Kunt and Huizinga 2004). Besely (1994), however argues that monopoly may not 
always be inefficient, for as lenders grow larger, their potential to diversify risk 
increases. In this case, loans will be distributed efficiently despite the aim of 
extracting the surplus from borrowers.  
 
How does the government ownership of banks affect the size and quality of the 
financial sector? La Porta et al. (2002) and Bath et al. (2001), have shown that a high 
government ownership of banks can slow down financial sector development, lead to 
a concentration of bank lending and slow down economic growth. This is supported 
by Dinc (2005) who shows that a high government ownership of banks can lead to an 
inefficient channelling of credit to government officials. Bertrand et al. (2004) in a 
study of the effects of banking deregulation on the industrial structure in France, 
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argue that deregulation relaxing government intervention in bank lending has led to 
greater competition in the credit market. Hence, the empirical evidence suggests that 
the government ownership of banks can reduce financial sector size. The government 
ownership of banks however, has been defended on the basis that these banks can 
finance large scale projects that can generate positive externalities for the economy as 
a whole (Dinc 2005). Besely (1994) further shows that market failures in developing 
countries justify government intervention in rural credit markets. This view is echoed 
by Andrianova et al. (2008) who argue that the government sector can establish banks 
to jump start economies with very low institutional quality. 
 
 
Guisio et al. (2006) in a study of bank competition of Italian states shows that 
liberalisation leads to an increase in bank efficiency by contributing to a fall in 
interest rate spreads. Andrianova et al. (2008) note that subsidized state banks have an 
advantage over private banks, as they can offer more competitive interest rates 
compared to private banks to certain sectors. Although subsidisation does not 
necessarily imply increased efficiency, it would contribute to lower interest rate 
margins. Hence, if remittances contribute to an increase in the volume of deposits and 
the availability of credit, government banks to offer more competitive interest rates 
compared to private banks.  
 
Remittances have led to greater opportunity for financial inclusion. The governments 
of many developing economies have been taking measures to increase financial 
inclusion. In Uganda for example, banks now have centralised databases and money 
can be sent to any part of the country within the same branch network in seconds at 
no, or minimal cost. Banks have in addition, introduced improved infrastructure and 
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financial literacy programmes (East African 2009). A number of countries in South 
America, Asia and Africa, have introduced mobile phone banking. “With new 
technology and computerisation of banking operations, new remittance products have 
been introduced in the market, which have increased the speed, cost-effectiveness and 
efficiency of the payments and settlement system. These include the National 
Electronic Funds Transfer (NEFT), Electronic Clearing System (ECS), Real Time 
Gross Settlement (RTGS) and ongoing endeavour at cheque truncation system leading 
to a national payment and settlement system” (Mohapatra 2009). These measures can 
be expected to increase access to finance and lower overhead costs and net interest 
margins.  
 
Providers aiming to create inclusive finance in developing countries comprise mainly 
of publicly owned banks that practice a social purpose (UN DESA and UNCDF 
2012). In developing countries, private and international banks usually cater to high 
end customers, while government banks cater to rural and low income customers. 
Government banks moreover, have larger banking networks that are required to 
promote inclusive growth. Consequently, the “Government has an important role to 
play in building an inclusive financial sector” (UN DESA and UNCDF 2012). The 
role of the government in promoting financial sector development by developing the 
necessary infrastructure, increasing financial sector competition, financial inclusion 
and developing institution better suited to the needs of low income households is 
highlighted in the work of Demirguc-Kunt (2006). Experience has shown that this 
role can be largely supportive, but that government intervention can also impede 
financial sector development” (UN DESA and UNCDF 2012). There have been no 
studies investigating the effects of migrant remittances on financial sector size and 
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efficiency through their interaction with the government ownership of banks. The 
present study is undertaken with the aim of filling this gap. 
 
3.    Country Characteristics 
Figures 1 and 2 show remittance receipts for the countries under study for 2010. The 
largest five recipients of remittances in the sample in absolute terms, are India (US 
$54,035 million), China (US $53,038 million), the Philippines (US $21,423 million), 
Bangladesh (US$10,852) and Nigeria (US $10,045 million). The largest five 
recipients of remittances as a percentage of GDP are: Tajikistan (31%), Lesotho 
(28.6%), Samoa (24.8%), Nepal and Moldova (23.2%) and Krygyz Republic (19.7%). 
Figure 3 plots the relationship between the ratio of deposit money bank assets to GDP 
and the ratio of migrant remittances to GDP for 2010. This preliminary analysis 


























Figure 1: Remittance Inflows 2010 (US$ Million) 
 




Figure 2: Remittance Flows as %  of GDP 2010 
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Note:  The regression represented by the fitted line reports a coefficient of 0.132 (Robust SE = 0.058),  
N = 65,  R2 = 0.03 from a regression of the ratio of deposit money banks assets to GDP to remittances 
to GDP.   
 
 
Figure 4 plots the ratio of remittances to GDP against the ratio of deposit banks assets 
to GDP, and Figure 5 plots the ratio of remittances to GDP against the interest rate 
margin for the countries for 2009, grouped by high and low government ownership of 
banks. Countries in which the government owns over 50% of the banking system 
assets (see Bath et al. 2001) are defined as countries with a high government 
ownership of banks and those with less than 50%, countries with a low government 
ownership of banks. Note that while there appears to be a positive relationship 
between the ratio of remittances to GDP and ratio of deposit bank assets in the low 
government ownership of banks group, the relationship between the two variables for 
the high government ownership of banks group is marginally negative. Figure 5 on 
the other hand shows that an increase in remittances leads to a fall in the interest 
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margin in countries with a high government ownership of banks while remittances do 
not appear to have an effect on the interest rate margin in countries with a low 
government ownership of banks. Hence, a question that arises at this point is, do 
migrant remittances lead to an increase in financial sector development in countries 
with high or low government bank ownership? 
 
Figure 4: Migrant Remittances and Deposit Bank Assets to GDP by Government 
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4. Data and Estimation Methodology 
4.1       Data 
The study uses annual data over the 1990-2010 period for 94 countries. See Data 
Appendix for list of countries, data sources and explanation. The sample constitutes a 
representative cross section of the regions covering Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 
the Middle East and North Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, East Asia and 
the Pacific, South Asia and Africa. The high income OECD countries are excluded 
from the analysis as the channels through which remittance inflows influence the 
financial sector in these economies are likely to be different from other regions. It is 
estimated that a large proportion of remittance flows are transmitted through informal 
channels. A limitation of the study therefore, is that it is only able to capture official 
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flows that are transmitted through formal channels2. The dependent variables in the 
study are the financial sector size and efficiency variables. Financial sector size is 
measured by: (1) the ratio of deposit banks assets to GDP (2) liquid assets to GDP (3) 
the ratio of domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions to the 
private sector to GDP. The provision of credit by the banking sector to the private 
sector is also an indicator of the degree of activity of financial intermediaries. 
Financial sector efficiency is measured by (1) the value of banks’ net interest margin 
to total assets, and (2) banks’ overhead costs to total assets. Increased competition in 
the financial sector should reduce overhead costs and interest margins. Therefore, if 
these measures are low it would imply increased efficiency and vice versa. These 
financial sector indicators are used by Aggarawal et al. (2006), Beck et al. (2003), 
among others.  
 
The main independent variable in the study is the ratio of migrant remittances to 
GDP. These are formal remittances that are recorded in the National Accounts.  
Migrant remittances are defined as the sum of workers’ remittances, compensation of 
employees, and migrants’ transfers. Other independent variables in the preliminary  
estimation include, the initial level of per capita income to capture the level of 
development of a country, openness and inflation variables based upon the previous 
literature. Studies have shown that current and capital account liberalisation have a 
favourable impact on financial sector development (see Chinn and Ito 2002, Aggarwal 
et al. 2006, Gupta et al.2009). The ratio of exports plus imports to GDP (Giuliano and 
Ruiz-Arranz 2009, Gupta et al. 2009), the ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP 
(Gupta et al. 2009), and a dummy variable for the exchange rate regime (Gupta et al. 
                                                 
2 A study by Freund and Spatafora (2005) empirically estimate informal remittance flows.  According 
to them, informal remittance flows account for about 35%-75% of official remittances to developing 
economies. 
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2009), are used to capture the degree of openness of an economy. If a country follows 
some form of fixed/managed/ crawling peg exchange rate regime, a dummy variable 
of one is assigned to it and zero if the currency is allowed to float independently. 
Inflation can discourage financial intermediation (Aggarwal et al. 2006) and also act 
as a proxy for uncertainty and risk (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2009). Therefore 
inflation is used an explanatory variable in the empirical estimation that follows 
(Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2009, Gupta et al.2009).  
 
Additional control variables are used to test the robustness of the results to the choice 
of variables. A well developed financial system requires a proper legal and regulatory 
framework. La Porta et al.(1997) show that countries in which  legal systems provide 
proper protection to investors against expropriation by entrepreneurs, are likely to 
have larger and better developed financial markets. They argue that countries with 
English Common law origin provide the highest investor protection while countries 
with French law origin provide investors with the least protection. Hence, a dummy 
variable is created for French legal origin. This dummy variable takes on a value of 
one for French legal origin and zero otherwise. As migration is likely to be higher 
from conflict ridden states, a dummy variable of one is assigned if a country 
experienced a conflict during the period under study, that is, 1990-2007, and zero 
otherwise. The level of financial literacy of a society can positively impact upon the 
volume of remittances transmitted through formal channels and thereby on financial 
sector development. Financial literacy cannot be measured directly. Following Beck 
and Martinez Peria (2011) who use secondary and tertiary enrolment ratios to measure 
financial literacy, the present study employs the secondary school enrolment ratio to 
proxy for the level of financial literacy. The tertiary enrolment ratio is not used as 
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fewer data points are available for tertiary enrolment. A well developed financial 
system also requires to be accompanied by the necessary infrastructure and 
technological know-how. Archibugi and Coco (2004), note that capital equipment and 
machinery “representing a key component of embodied technological capacity” are 
important for both developed and developing countries. They also note that the closest 
substitute for this is gross fixed capital formation. Given that data for technological 
know-how are limited, this is captured by the ratio of gross domestic fixed capital 
formation to GDP. Moreover, data for gross fixed capital formation are available for 
most countries and there is greater consistency in the data. As increased government 
expenditure can increase bank concentration and reduce competitiveness by crowding 
out private sector investment expenditure, the share of public consumption to GDP is 
also considered. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003) show that increased 
ethnic/religious fractionalisation can impede financial sector development. Therefore 
the religious fractionalisation measure of (Alesina et al. 2003) is employed to capture 
the degree of fractionalisation of a society.      
 
To investigate the hypothesis that remittances affect the financial sector through the 
government ownership of banks channel, the ratio of migrant remittances to GDP is 
interacted with the government ownership of banks from Barth, Caprio and Levine 
(2001 updated in 2008). 
 
4.2   Estimation Methods 
The study uses both pooled OLS and system GMM methods to estimate the influence 
of remittances on the financial sector.  
The following model forms the basis of the preliminary OLS estimation:  
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Fii = aRit +  xit β +  υit                  (1) 
where Fit  is the financial sector variable for country i in period t. Rit  is the remittance 
variable for country i in period t All control variables mentioned in Section 4 are 
captured by the vector xit. υi  is a random error term that captures all other variables.  
 
In order to exploit the time series dimension of the data and individual country 
specific effects correcting for any endogeneity bias in the explanatory variables, the 
Arellano-Bover (1995)-Blundell Bond (1998) system GMM method is used. Blundell 
and Bond (1998) show that the first differenced GMM procedure could cause large 
finite-sample biases when used to estimate autoregressive models for fairly persistent 
series for short panels. They also show that these biases could be reduced by 
including additional moment conditions. That is the use of lagged first differences as 
instruments for equations in levels, in addition to the lagged levels as instruments for 
equations in first differences (Arellano and Bover 1995, Wooldridge 2002). Given the 
fairly short panel in used in this study, this approach is considered to be superior to 
the first differenced GMM procedure. Therefore, equation in levels (2), is 
instrumented with lagged first differences of the variables, while the equation in first 
differences, (3), is instrumented with lagged levels of the variables.  
Fit =  γFit-1 + aRit +  xit β + µi + ηt +  υit         (2) 
Fit – Fit-1  =  γ(Fit-1  - Fii-2) + a(Rit – Rii-1) +  β( xit − xit-1)  + ηt +  (υit - υit-1)       (3) 
The variable definitions are the same as for equation (1) with the lagged values of the 
variables now entering the equations and µi representing a country specific effect and 
ηt, a fixed time effect. The GMM estimator is based on the assumption that the error 
terms are not serially correlated and that the explanatory variables are weakly 
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exogenous or not correlated with future realizations of the error terms under which the 
following moment condition holds for the first difference estimator: 
E[Fit-s (υit - υit-1)]= 0;  E[Rit-s (υit - υit-1)]= 0;    E[xit-s (υit - υit-1)]= 0    where i = 1…..n, 
t = 3….T   and s≥ 2. 
and as mentioned above the levels equation is instrumented with lagged first 
differences of the variables which leads to the additional moments condition: 
E[∆Fit-s (µi + υit )] = 0; E[∆Rit-s (µi + υit )] = 0; E[∆xit -s (µi + υit )] = 0 for s =1. 
Two diagnostic tests are carried out on the system GMM estimates. The Sargan test 
for over-identifying restrictions under which the null hypothesis is that the 
instruments are not correlated with the residuals. The second is the Arellano-Bond test 
for second order correlation in the first differenced residuals. 
 
5.     Empirical Estimation 
OLS Estimation 
Table 1 presents OLS results for the model. The dependent variable in column (1) is 
Deposit Money Bank Assets to GDP, column (2) Private Sector Credit to GDP, 
column (3) liquid assets to GDP, column (4) overhead costs to total assets, and 
column (5), net interest margin to total assets. Estimation is initially carried out with 
migrant remittances to GDP, the level of GDP per capita, the ratio of exports to GDP, 
FDI to GDP, and an exchange rate dummy variable, all of which capture the degree of 
openness of an economy and the rate of inflation as explanatory variables.  
[Table 1, about here] 
The results indicate that migrant remittances have a positive and significant impact on 
the financial sector size variables. For example, column (1) indicates that a 1% 
increase in remittances lead to a 0.03% increase bank deposits and column (2) that a 
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1% increase in remittances lead to a 0.03% increase in private credit to GDP. An 
increase in remittances lead to a fall in overhead costs and net interest margins. In 
Column (4), a 1% increase in remittances lead to a 0.004% decrease in overhead costs 
and in column (5), a 0.005% decrease in the net interest margin. The estimates on per 
capita income are statistically significant and suggest that a higher per capita income 
is associated with an increase in the financial sector size variables and lower overhead 
costs and net interest margins. The coefficients on the ratio of exports to GDP is 
statistically significant in all columns indicating that greater openness contributes to 
an increase in financial sector size and rise in efficiency. Foreign direct investment is 
statistically significant in columns (2), (4) and (5). Inflation has a significant negative 
impact on both financial sector size and efficiency. The estimates on the exchange 
rate variables are statistically  significant in columns (1), (3) and (5) suggesting that 
exchange controls exert a negative effect on the volume of deposits and liquid assets 
to GDP and lead to an increase in the net interest margin.  
 
Table 2 estimates the equations with additional control variables mentioned in Section 
4. Including the secondary school enrolment ratio reduces the sample size 
significantly however.  
[Table 2, about here] 
As before, the variable of interest, migrant remittances, have a significant positive 
impact on both financial sector size and efficiency. Columns (1), (2) and (3) indicate 
that a 1%  increase in migrant remittances will lead to a 0.04%  increase deposit 
money bank assets to GDP, a 0.03% increase in credit to GDP and a 0.02% increase 
in liquid assets to GDP respectively. The French legal origin dummy variable has a 
significant negative impact on the size and efficiency of the financial sector in  
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columns (2), (4) and (5). Openness as measured by exports to GDP has a statistically 
significant positive impact on financial sector size and efficiency. FDI is statistically 
significant only in column (3). Inflation exerts a significant negative effect on the 
financial sector size and efficiency variables. In column (1) for instance, a 1% 
increase in the rate of inflation will lead to a 0.06% fall in deposit bank assets. The 
coefficient on the exchange rate dummy variable is statistically significant in all 
columns except for column (3), suggesting that exchange rate controls lead to a fall in 
the financial sector size variables and a rise in overhead costs and net interest 
margins. The coefficients on secondary schooling are statistically significant 
suggesting that financial literacy has a positive impact on financial sector size and 
efficiency. The coefficients on government consumption are statistically significant in 
columns (3) and (4) suggesting that increases in government consumption are 
associated with increases in bank liquid assets and a rise in overhead costs. Population 
growth has a significant positive effect on financial sector size and also leads to an 
increase in the net interest margin. Gross domestic capital formation is statistically 
significant in columns (1), (2), (4) and (5) and the coefficient on religious 
fractionalisation in column (1). The conflict dummy variable is significant in all 
columns except for column (2). An increase in conflict reduces the volume of deposits 
and the liquid assets held by banks. The results suggest that conflict also causes 
overhead costs and net interest margins to fall.  
GMM Estimation 
Table 3 replicates the preliminary regressions in Table 1 using system GMM. The 
one-step GMM estimator is used in the present study3. This yields standard errors that 
                                                 
3 Although the two-step estimator is more efficient for system GMM, Monte Carlo studies show that 
the two-step GMM estimator converges to its asymptotic distribution very slowly. In finite samples, the 
asymptotic standard errors associated with the two-step GMM estimators can be downward biased and 
thus be an unreliable measure for inference (see Bond, Hoeffler and Temple (2001). 
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are not only asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity but have also been found to 
be more reliable for finite sample estimation (see Blundell and Bond 1998, Bond et al. 
2001). 
[Table 3, about here] 
The results for the GMM estimation are consistent with those obtained under OLS 
estimation in Table 1. The remittance variables continue to be highly statistically 
significant. Exports to GDP is significant in all columns except for column (4) and  
FDI is significant in  columns (2) to (4). Exchange rate controls have a significant 
negative impact on deposit money bank assets and private credit, and also lead to 
increases in overhead costs. Inflation has a significant negative impact on financial 
sector size and efficiency. The lagged values of the dependent variables are all 
statistically significant reflecting a high degree of persistency in the variables. The 
Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions where the null hypothesis is that the 
instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals, and the Arellano-Bond test for second 
order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, confirm that the moments 
conditions cannot be rejected. 
 
Table 4 replicates the regressions carried out in Table 2 with additional control 
variables using system GMM. The results confirm the OLS findings that remittances 
have a positive impact on financial sector development. Exports have a significant 
positive effect on the financial sector size variables and inflation and exchange rate 
controls a negative impact on financial sector development.  Secondary schooling is 
statistically significant in all columns and gross domestic capital formation in 
columns (1), (2), (4) and (5) suggesting the importance of financial literacy and 
infrastructure for financial sector development. There is some evidence of a negative 
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effect of religious fractionalisation on financial sector development. Conflict has a 
negative impact on bank deposits and leads to a fall in the net interest margin. 
[Table 4, about here] 
 
Government Ownership, Financial Sector Development and Migrant 
Remittances 
Table 5 reports results for the influence of remittances on the financial sector through 
the government ownership channel. System GMM is used as this method best 
addresses the possible endogeneity of migrant remittances and also accounts for the 
effect of time invariant or very slowly changing government ownership of banks.    
[Table 5, about here] 
The overall results are consistent with those above with remittances leading to 
increases in financial sector size and efficiency. The interaction terms on the 
government ownership of banks x migrant remittances are statistically significant in 
columns (1), (2) (4) and (5). The interaction terms in columns (1) and (2) suggest that 
remittances lead to increases in the volume of deposits and private credit in countries 
with low government bank ownership and the interaction terms in columns (4) and (5) 
suggest that remittances lead to a fall in overhead costs and net interest margins in 
countries with high government bank ownership.   
 
The Model Disaggregated by Government Ownership of Banks 
Next, the baseline model is re-estimated by dividing the sample into two groups -low 
and high government ownership of banks. This is to compare how remittances 
influence financial sector development in these two groups.  The results are reported 
in Table 6. 
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[Table 6, about here] 
The results are consistent with those obtained above in Table 5. Migrant remittances, 
have a positive significant impact on deposit money bank assets, private credit and 
liquid assets to GDP in the low government bank ownership group. Remittances also 
have a positive significant impact on deposit money bank assets and private credit in 
the high government bank ownership group. However, the coefficients on the 
remittance variables in columns (1)-(3) are higher and statistically more significant 
for the low government bank ownership group suggesting that remittances have a 
larger positive impact on the financial sector size variables in the low government 
ownership of banks group. For example, column (1) suggests that a 1% increase in 
remittances will lead to a 0.04% increase in deposits in the low government bank 
ownership group as opposed to a 0.02% increase in deposits in the high government 
bank ownership group. The remittance coefficients in columns (4) and (5) suggest that 
remittances lead to increased efficiency, or, a larger fall in overhead costs and net 
interest margins in the high government bank ownership group. The remittance 
coefficients in columns (4) and (5) are statistically significant for the high government 
ownership group, however, not statistically significant for the low government 
ownership group. These results are consistent with those obtained in Table 6 above. 
An examination of the other variables show that per capita income has a positive 
impact on the size and efficiency of the financial sector in both groups.  An increase 
in the ratio of exports to GDP exerts a positive significant impact on the financial 
sector size variables and a fall in the net interest margin. FDI is not statistically 
significant in the high government bank ownership group, however, has a positive 
effect on private credit and the financial sector efficiency variables in the low 
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government bank ownership group. Exchange rate controls and inflation influence the 
financial sector size and efficiency variables negatively. 
 
Robustness Tests 
Several tests are carried out to ensure the robustness of the results.  The study uses a 
number of alternative measures of financial sector development to check the 
robustness of the results to the measure of financial sector development. Financial 
sector size is proxied by three different variables: the ratio of deposit banks assets to 
GDP, liquid assets to GDP and domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial 
institutions to the private sector to GDP. Financial sector efficiency is measured by 
two variables: the value of banks’ net interest margin to total assets, and banks’ 
overhead costs to total assets. The results are robust to the measure of financial sector 
development. 
 
Several additional control variables are used to check the robustness of the results to 
the conclusions of the study. These control variables which include, population 
growth, secondary schooling, government consumption, gross domestic capital 
formation, religious fractionalisation and a conflict dummy variable do not change the 
overall conclusions of the study. 
 
System GMM is used in addition to OLS to ensure that the results are robust to the 
estimation procedure. The system GMM method allows correcting for the potential 
endogeneity of migrant remittances and other explanatory variables. It also permits 
the inclusion of time invariant regressors which would disappear in difference GMM. 
Two diagnostic tests are carried out on the system GMM estimates, a Sargan test for 
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overidentifying restrictions and the Arellano-Bond test for second order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals. The Sargan test and the serial correlation 
test confirm that the moments conditions cannot be rejected.   
The sample is further disaggregated by the government ownership of banks to confirm 
the finding that remittances have a stronger influence on financial sector size in 
countries with a lower government ownership of banks and a stronger impact on 
financial sector efficiency in countries with a higher government ownership of banks. 
The disaggregated models confirm the findings derived in Table 5.  
 
 
6.    Conclusions 
This study examines the impact of migrant remittances on financial sector size and 
efficiency. The study also investigates the effect of remittances on financial sector 
size and efficiency through their interaction with the government ownership of banks.  
The results suggest that remittances lead to an increase in financial sector size, 
consistent with the findings of Aggarwal et al.(2006), Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 
(2009), Gupta et al. (2009). The results also suggest that remittances lead to a fall in 
overhead costs and net interest margins. The interaction terms on bank ownership x 
migrant remittances, and the government bank ownership disaggregated estimates, 
suggest that remittances lead to an increase in the volume of deposits mobilised, credit 
disbursed and liquid assets in countries with a low government ownership of banks. 
Although remittances also lead to an increase in financial sector size in countries with 
a high government ownership of banks, a greater increase in financial sector size is 
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Data  Sources and Description: 
- Ratio of Deposit Bank Assets to GDP, Domestic Credit by Deposit Banks and Other 
Financial Institutions/ to GDP, Liquid Assets to GDP, Banks Net Interest Margin to 
Total Assets, Banks’ Overhead Costs to Total Assets annual data 1990-2010:  from 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999 updated in 2009) and World Development 
Indicators 2012. 
- Migrant Remittances to GDP data 1990-2010: World Development Indicators 
- GDP per capita annual data 1990-2010 Purchasing Power Parity: World 
Development Indicators. 
-  Foreign Direct Investment to GDP annual data 1990-2010: World Development 
Indicators. 
-  Exports to GDP annual data 1990-2010: World Development Indicators. 
-  Exchange Rate Dummy Variable: Takes on a value of 1 if a country follows some 
form of fixed/managed/crawling peg exchange rate regime and a value of 0 is the 
currency of a country is allowed to float freely:  from Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff 
2008. 
- Inflation (consumer price index) annual data 1990-2010: World Development 
Indicators. 
- Government Consumption to GDP annual data 1990-2010: World Development 
Indicators. 
- Government Ownership of Banks: Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001 updated in 2008). 
-  Legal origin from La Porta, Lopez-DeSilanes and Shleifer (1997) and Harper and 
Mc Nulty (2008). A dummy variable of one is assigned for French legal origin and 
zero otherwise. 
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- Gross Domestic Capital Formation/ to DP annual data 1990-2010: World 
Development Indicators. 
- Net Secondary Enrolment Ratio annual data 1990-2010: World Development 
Indicators. 
-  Conflict Dummy Variable: takes on a value of 1 if a country experienced a conflict 
during the period under study, and zero otherwise. From the Encyclopedia of  
Conflicts Since World War II edited by Ciment J (2006). 
-  Religious fractionalisation 2001: from Alesina A, Devleeschauwer A, Easterly W, 
Kurlat S and Wacziarg R (2003).  
-  Population growth rate annual data 1990-2010: World Development Indicators. 
 
Countries in the Sample 
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, 
Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, China, Congo, Costa Rica, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Ethiopia, Fiji, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, 
Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kosovo, Kyrgz Republic, Lao, Latvia, Lebanon, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius, 
Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, 
Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, 
Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Samoa, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, 
Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, 
Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, Vanuatu, Venezuela, 




       Table 1:  Migrant Remittances and Financial Sector Size and Efficiency:  
 
       OLS Estimation 
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(0.003)* 










R2 0.30 0.25 0.32 0.30 0.33 
Observations 1021 1035 1020 900 912 
Note:  Robust standard errors clustered by region reported in parenthesis.  ***,  **,  *, significant at the 



























Table 2:  Migrant Remittances and  Financial Sector Size and Efficiency with 
Additional Control Variables:  OLS Estimation 
 







































































































































































R2 0.57 0.42 0.50 0.43 0.45 
Observations 452 466 458 446 448 
Note:  Robust standard errors clustered by region reported in parenthesis.  ***,  **,  *, significant at the 























Table 3:  Migrant Remittances and Financial Sector Size and Efficiency:  System 
GMM Estimation 
 





































































































Sargan Test for 
over-identifying 

























Observations 1021 1035 1020 900 912 
Note:  Standard errors reported in parenthesis.  ***,  **,  *, significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively.  The difference equation is instrumented with the lagged levels, two periods, of the 
dependent variable and the levels equation with the difference lagged one period. Time specific fixed 




















Table 4:  Migrant Remittances and  Financial Sector Size and Efficiency with 
Additional Control Variables:  System GMM  



















































































































































































Sargan Test for 
over-identifying 
restriction: p value 
0.30 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.26 
Arellano-Bond Test 
for 2nd Order 
Autocorrelation: p 
value 
0.26 0.30 0.43 0.23 0.25 
Observations 452 466 458 446 448 
Note:  Standard errors reported in parenthesis.  ***,  **,  *, significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. The difference equation is instrumented with the lagged levels, two periods, of the 
dependent variable and the levels equation with the difference lagged one period. Time specific fixed 








Table 5: Bank Ownership, Migrant Remittances and Financial Sector 
Development: System GMM 


















































































































Sargan Test for 
over-identifying 
restriction: p value 
0.22 0.26 0.24 0.21 0.20 
Arellano-Bond Test 
for 2nd Order 
Autocorrelation: p 
value 
0.45 0.24 0.24 0.27 0.24 
Observations 620 622 644 568 560 
Note: Standard errors reported in parenthesis.  ***,  **,  *, significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. The difference equation is instrumented with the lagged levels, two periods, of the 
dependent variable and the levels equation with the difference lagged one period. Time specific fixed 
effects are included as regressors.  
 










Table 6: Bank Ownership, Migrant Remittances and Financial Sector 
Development Disaggregated by Government Ownership of Banks: System GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
High Government Bank Ownership Group 







Overhead Costs Net Interest 
Margin 




















































































Sargan Test for over-
identifying restriction: 
p value 
0.42 0.24 0.28 0.23 0.22 




0.24 0.023 0.25 0.28 0.23 
Observations 300 300 312 280 274 
Low Government Bank Ownership Group 







Overhead Costs Net Interest 
Margin 




















































































Sargan Test for over-
identifying restriction: 
p value 
0.20 0.19 0.19 0.24 0.23 




0.27 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.28 
Observations 320 322 332 288 286 
Note:  Standard errors reported in parenthesis.  ***,  **,  *, significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively.  The difference equation is instrumented with the lagged levels, two periods, of the 
dependent variable and the levels equation with the difference lagged one period. Time specific fixed 
effects are included as regressors.  
 
 
